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This paper estimates a general equilibrium model of school quality and household residential and 
school choice for economies with multiple public school districts and private (religious and non-sectarian) 
schools. The estimates, obtained through full-solution methods, are used to simulate two large-scale 
private school voucher programs in the Chicago metropolitan area: universal vouchers and vouchers 
restricted to non-sectarian schools. In the simulations, both programs increase private school enrollment 
and affect household residential choice. However, under non-sectarian vouchers private school enrollment 
expands less than under universal vouchers and religious school enrollment declines for large vouchers. 
Fewer households benefit from non-sectarian vouchers. (JEL I22, H73, H42, C51).   
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1.  Introduction                          
Private school vouchers play an important role in the debate about education reform in the United States. 
Vouchers, it is argued, give households the opportunity to enroll their children in private schools and 
access their preferred type of education. Whereas some households prefer private schools over the public 
schools in their metropolitan areas, they face budget constraints that restrict them to public schools. 
Although public schools have no explicit tuition, in metropolitan areas where public schools have 
residence requirements households must choose public schools and residences as bundles, whose costs are 
determined by housing prices and property taxes.  Therefore, to gain access to their preferred public 
schools households might choose to live in places they would not have selected in the absence of 
bundling. Vouchers may break this bundling by allowing households to choose private schools, which 
have no residence requirements. 
Thus, vouchers may not only give households more school choices, but also alter household 
residential decisions. As a result, public school districts may experience changes in their property values, 
school funding, and the composition of their student populations. To gain insight into the potential impact 
of large-scale private school voucher programs, in this paper I examine these general equilibrium effects 
by estimating a general equilibrium model that jointly determines school quality and household 
residential and school choices in an economy with multiple public school districts and private schools. I 
then use the parameter estimates to simulate two different voucher programs.  
Since the voucher programs enacted to date in the United States have included a small number of 
voucher recipients and have often restricted the set of eligible private schools,
2 researchers have had 
insufficient data to evaluate the general equilibrium effects of potential large-scale voucher programs and 
                                                 
2 Publicly funded voucher programs currently exist in Florida; Cleveland, Ohio; Utah (for students with special 
needs); Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and the District of Columbia. Voucher-like laws in Maine and Vermont provide 
school choice in towns without public schools. See www.ij.org and www.heritage.org. 
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have turned to simulation to investigate them.
3 Thus, I build upon Nechyba’s (1999) theoretical work to 
develop a framework that is rich enough for empirical implementation and counterfactual analysis. My 
approach differs from Nechyba’s in a number of important ways. First, I incorporate household 
idiosyncratic tastes for location and school choices. This allows for the plausible heterogeneity that 
creates, for instance, a strong attachment to particular suburban public schools or urban Catholic schools 
on the part of otherwise similar households. Moreover, this addition gives rise to an equilibrium that 
mixes households with heterogeneous income and school choices even in districts with no housing quality 
variation, a significant departure from Nechyba’s model.  
Second, I include household religious preferences and two types of private schools, Catholic and 
non-Catholic. Religious schools comprised 85 percent of the 1990 private school enrollment in high 
school grades (U.S. Department of Education (1992)). Furthermore, the considerable variation in private 
school markets among metropolitan areas is related to geographic differences in the distribution of 
religious affiliations. Religious preferences are thus relevant to the understanding of these markets 
although private school modeling thus far has not considered their role.
4  
The inclusion of religion in the model has important implications for voucher analysis, since it 
answers such questions as: what type of private schools would expand under vouchers and at what rate, 
how religious preferences would affect the distributional effects of vouchers, how vouchers would affect 
schools’ religious compositions, where Catholics would choose to reside under a voucher regime, and the 
minimum voucher level necessary to make a household better off given its wealth and religious 
preferences. Furthermore, the use of publicly funded vouchers at religious schools is a contentious issue. 
Although the Supreme Court upheld voucher use at religious schools in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
(06.27.02), states can still choose whether or not to include religious schools when designing voucher 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Bearse, Glomm and Ravikumar (2001), Caucutt (2002), Cohen-Zada and Justman (2005), Epple 
and Romano (1998, 2003a), Fernandez and Rogerson (2003), Manski (1992), Nechyba (1999, 2000, 2003). 
4 In simultaneous work, Cohen-Zada and Justman (2005) have considered religious preferences in their voucher 
simulations by calibrating a single-district economy without household idiosyncratic preferences. A number of their 
qualitative results agree with mine.   3
programs.
5 My model is thus able to analyze the effects of prohibiting voucher use in religious schools. 
My particular focus is on Catholic schools, which comprise the largest and most homogeneous group of 
schools within the private school market,
6 and attract most of the religious school enrollment in the states 
that have debated the participation of religious schools in voucher programs. Moreover, Catholic schools 
have historically had a strong presence among inner-city low-income students, who have often received 
subsidized tuition and who are targeted by most current voucher proposals. 
Third, I include non-residential property in the model for a better reflection of the environment 
that determines educational expenditure for public schools. Since an important policy issue concerning 
vouchers is their ability to improve educational outcomes for low-income students in the central city of 
metropolitan areas, the model must represent the sources and magnitude of public school spending in 
those districts, often endowed with large amounts of non-residential property. 
Furthermore, in contrast with all other researchers who have examined the general equilibrium 
effects of vouchers by relying on calibrated numerical examples, I estimate my model.
 7 Estimating the 
model allows me to investigate its empirical properties, most importantly whether it captures the relevant 
aspects of the reality presumably affected by the policies of interest. The estimation also reveals which 
dimensions of the data are well fitted and which are not, and how specific features of the model affect the 
parameter estimates and their accuracy as well as the fit of the data. Such information is, in turn, 
invaluable guidance for building models equipped to answer the desired policy questions.  
                                                 
5 Many states have constitutional provisions (“Blaine amendments”) with more prohibitive criteria for the separation 
of church and state than those found in the First Amendment. While state voucher programs were upheld by the 
Wisconsin and Ohio Supreme Courts when challenged on the basis of Blaine amendments, a similar case before the 
Florida Supreme Court is still pending. See Bolick (2003), Viteritti (1999), and www.ij.org for further reference. 
6 According to the 1989 Private School Survey, 58 percent of private school enrollment in grades 9 through 12 was 
in Catholic schools, 27 percent in other religious schools, and the remaining 15 percent in non-sectarian schools in 
the United States in 1989. Moreover, Catholic schools captured 75 percent of the 1989 total private school 
enrollment. Neal (2002) reviews the literature that documents the positive effects of Catholic school attendance. 
7 The only other paper that simulates large-scale voucher experiments based on econometric estimates is Altonji, 
Huang and Taber (2004), which focuses on the impacts of vouchers on the peer group of the students who remain in 
public schools, holding locational decisions and the political economy equilibrium constant.   4
Although models of household sorting across jurisdictions originated with Tiebout’s (1956)   
work,
8 only recently have researchers estimated them. Since household residential choices interact with 
housing prices, community compositions, and the level of local public goods such as education, 
researchers have developed estimation approaches consistent with the structure of the equilibrium. As the 
complexity of these models often precludes closed-form solutions, the challenge arises of ensuring that in 
the estimation all the conditions that characterize an equilibrium hold, as discussed below. 
The inclusion of household idiosyncratic preferences in my model resembles the use of random 
utility models in demand models for differentiated products used in industrial organization (Berry (1994), 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)). Applying this framework, Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2004) 
have estimated an equilibrium model of household sorting using restricted-access Census micro data for 
the San Francisco Bay Area. Although this model features a rich and flexible demand side for housing 
and location specific characteristics, it does not endogenize the provision of local public goods. Hence, 
this model does not account for the variation in spending, and possibly quality, across public schools in a 
given metropolitan area, which in turn relates to which households would be more likely to take up 
vouchers, and how vouchers would affect local public school quality. In addition, this model does not 
explore the role of privately provided alternatives to local public goods. 
  Furthermore, in this framework the demand for each jurisdiction is the aggregation of individual 
demands emerging from the random utility model and is thus a function of the mean utility level across 
households. This, in turn, is found by equating the predicted demand for each jurisdiction with the 
observed population –namely, by “inverting” the jurisdiction’s population share. Since mean utility is 
assumed a linear function of the jurisdiction’s observed and unobserved characteristics for a given set of 
parameters, and the observed characteristics – such as housing prices – are presumably correlated with the 
unobserved ones, the parameters of the model are estimated through an instrumental variable regression 
of the mean utility level on the observed characteristics. Hence, estimation relies on a two-step procedure 
                                                 
8 See Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a recent survey of the literature on Tiebout models.     5
that first solves for the partial equilibrium of the housing market given other endogenous variables and 
then addresses this endogeneity through instrumental variables techniques. 
This paper, in contrast, features a one-step, full-solution estimation method that solves for the 
general equilibrium of the model as part of the estimation procedure. This approach is particularly well 
suited to ensure that all equilibrium conditions hold at once because the very computation of an 
equilibrium is the search for an allocation that fulfills all those conditions. While clearly desirable, full-
solution estimation is computationally more costly than a two-step procedure. Therefore, I have 
developed fast algorithms to compute the equilibrium that make my estimation approach computationally 
feasible. Furthermore, this equilibrium computation is the same one used for policy simulations, which 
yields internal consistency and makes policy outcomes completely transparent. Besides being the first 
attempt to estimate a multi-jurisdictional model by full-solution methods, this paper illustrates how a 
similar procedure might apply to estimate other types of equilibrium models.
9 Thus, this research lies at 
the frontier of computational analysis and estimation. 
The first papers to estimate an equilibrium model of household sorting among local jurisdictions 
while accounting for the endogeneity of local tax and expenditure policies were Epple and Sieg (1999) 
and Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001). This model, however, does not include private schools. Furthermore, 
its local public good index aggregates elements with potentially dissimilar roles in a voucher 
environment.
10 While household preference heterogeneity plays a key role in household sorting across 
jurisdictions in this model, housing quality variation within and across districts is essential to sorting in 
my framework. The identification of Epple and Sieg’s model, estimated through a two-step procedure by 
exploiting necessary conditions for the equilibrium, relies on variation across districts within a 
metropolitan area, whereas identification in my framework also relies on variation across metropolitan 
                                                 
9 Full-solution estimation has also been developed by Calabrese, Epple, Romer and Sieg (2004) in work initiated 
after mine, for a model that extends Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001). 
10 For instance, even if all households have the same preferences for housing and school quality, some of them might 
be willing to live in districts with low public school quality yet relatively good housing and low property-tax 
inclusive housing prices, for the sake of sending their children to private schools.   6
areas. Moreover, policy simulations carried out with a model related to Epple and Sieg’s have focused on 
exogenous public good changes (Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf and Walsh (2004)). In contrast, my paper 
recognizes that the provision of local public goods would adjust endogenously under vouchers both 
through household individual choices and voters’ collective decisions. Thus, my model is uniquely suited 
to answer the policy questions of interest.  
To estimate the model I match key features of the predicted equilibrium through a minimum 
distance estimator using 1990 data on a cross-section of metropolitan areas and school districts. The 
estimates successfully capture the pattern of income stratification and the distribution of housing values 
across districts within metropolitan areas, and replicate public school spending and private school 
enrollment rates reasonably well.  Using the parameter estimates, I assessed the effects of two 
hypothetical policies for the Chicago metropolitan area: the introduction of universal vouchers and of 
vouchers restricted to non-sectarian private schools (“non-sectarian vouchers”)
11.  Universal voucher 
analysis provides insight into the impact of an unrestricted voucher program, of which any other voucher 
program may be seen as a special case. In these simulations, a voucher is a set amount of money received 
by the household from the state for the exclusive purpose of paying private school tuition.  
According to my simulation results, both programs increase private school enrollment and affect 
household residential choice. For instance, some voucher users migrate towards neighborhoods with 
lower tax-inclusive housing prices and send their children to private schools, thus weakening the 
residential stratification of the current public school system. In the two programs, most households gain 
school quality for vouchers of at least $3,000. While households with an approximate wealth of $35,000 
experience the largest school quality gains in both programs, low-income households reap the largest 
welfare gains. Despite these similarities, universal and non-sectarian vouchers differ in important ways. 
Universal vouchers increase enrollment at both Catholic and non-Catholic private schools, yet when 
                                                 
11 For simplicity, this paper considers only one type of religious school, namely Catholic schools. Thus, the non-
sectarian voucher simulation is the simulation of vouchers restricted to non-Catholic private schools, although it is 
meant to capture the effects of restricting vouchers to non-sectarian schools.   7
vouchers are restricted to non-sectarian schools, overall private school enrollment expands less and 
Catholic school enrollment declines as the voucher rises. Further, fewer households benefit from non-
sectarian vouchers, particularly in the low-income segment. Whereas households who prefer Catholic 
schools benefit the most from universal vouchers, they lose the most from non-sectarian vouchers.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides descriptive statistics of 
the data employed; Section 3 presents the model; Section 4 discusses the computational version of the 
model used for estimation purposes; Section 5 describes the estimation procedure; Section 6 discusses the 
estimation results; Section 7 analyzes voucher effects in policy simulations, and Section 8 concludes. 
2.  Descriptive Statistics 
My analysis focuses on the metropolitan areas of New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Boston, St. 
Louis, and Pittsburgh, and the secondary and unified school districts therein. As of 1990, these were 
among the twenty largest metropolitan areas in the United States. They also depended highly on local 
sources for public school funding and had populations that were at least 25 percent Catholic (see Table 1).  
As Table 2 shows, the school districts in these metropolitan areas vary widely along the 
dimensions of interest, such as private school enrollment, average household income and rental value, and 
public school spending per student. Moreover, households with children in private schools tend to have 
higher incomes while living in higher-rental value houses than households with children in public 
schools. The central city district is the largest district in each of my sample’s metropolitan areas and 
captures most of the private school enrollment and non-residential property. 
In addition, the geographic variation in private school markets across metropolitan areas seems to 
be shaped, at least partly, by the geographic variation in the distribution of adherents to different 
religions. Among the twenty largest metropolitan areas in the United States, those with higher private 
school enrollment rates have higher Catholic school enrollment rates and proportionally more Catholics. 
Moreover, the correlation between the fraction of students enrolled in Catholic schools and the fraction of 
Catholics equals 0.79, which squares with the fact that in 1990 about 85 percent of Catholic high school   8
students in the United States were Catholic (National Catholic Educational Association (1990b)).  
3. The Model 
In the model, an economy is a set of public school districts with fixed boundaries that contain 
neighborhoods of different qualities. There are three types of schools: public, private Catholic, and private 
non-Catholic. Households that differ in endowment, religious preferences and idiosyncratic tastes for 
locations and school types maximize utility by choosing a location and a school for their children and by 
voting for property tax rates used to fund public schools. In equilibrium, no household wishes to move, 
switch to a different school, or vote differently. 
Households and Districts 
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, each one endowed with one house. The set of 
houses in the economy is partitioned into school districts. Every district d is in turn partitioned into 
neighborhoods, and there are H neighborhoods in total in the economy. Houses may differ across 
neighborhoods, but within a given neighborhood are homogenous and have the same housing quality and 
rental price. The size of the housing stock equals the measure of endowed houses and the housing stock 
cannot be varied in quantity or quality. Furthermore, each household has one child, who must attend a 
school, either public or private. One public school exists in each district
12 and the child may attend only 
the public school of the district where the household resides. If parents choose to send their child to a 
private school, Catholic or non-Catholic, they are not bound to any rule linking residence and school.  
In addition to a house, households are endowed with a certain amount of income and there are I 
income levels. Besides endowment, households differ in their religious orientation, which is given by 
their valuation of Catholic schools relative to non-Catholic schools. Thus, a household has one of K 
possible religious types, where types  L , , 1K  are Catholic, and the others non-Catholic. Not all the L 
                                                 
12 This assumption rules out the existence of neighborhood schools, such as those in Epple and Romano (2003b).    9
Catholic types are necessarily identical, for they may differ in their relative valuation of Catholic schools, 
and the same is true for the non-Catholic types. Finally, households also differ in their idiosyncratic 
preference for each location and type of school. 
Household preferences are described by the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:  
dh k e c s c s U = =
− − κ κ ε κ
ε α β β α     , ) , , , (
1       ( 1 )    
where  () 1 , 0 , ∈ β α , kdh is an exogenous parameter representing the inherent quality of neighborhood h in 
district d (i.e., housing size and age, geographic amenities, etc.), c is household consumption, s is the 
parental valuation of the quality of the child’s school, which depends on the household’s religious 
preferences, andε is the household’s idiosyncratic preference for the location and school type attended by 
the child. Furthermore,ε is distributed according to a continuous distribution  ) (ε G , and is independently 
and identically distributed across locations and school types for a given household and across households. 
Household i seeks to maximize utility (1) subject to the following budget constraint: 
n n y dh d p y t T p t c + − = + + + ) 1 ( ) 1 (         ( 2 )  
where yn is the household’s income, ty is a state tax rate, and pn is the rental price of the household’s 
endowment house. Given its per-period total income, represented by the right-hand side of (2), the 
household chooses to live in location  ) , ( h d  with housing price pdh and local property tax rate td. It also 
chooses a school for its child with tuition T, and T = 0 for public schools. The remaining income is used 
for consumption c.  
Production of school quality   
All schools in the economy produce school quality s ~ according to the following production function: 
ρ ρ − =
1 ~ x q s            ( 3 )  
where  [] 1 , 0 ∈ ρ , q stands for the school’s average peer quality and x is spending per student at the 
school. Denote by S the set of households whose children attend the school and by  ) (S y  the average   10
income of these households. Then the school’s average peer quality is defined as  ) (S y q = .
13 If the 
school is private, the spending per student x equals tuition T and may be supplemented with non-tuition 
revenue, whereas it equals the spending per student in district d, xd, if the school is public and run by the 
local government. 
The parental valuation of school quality (see s in equation (1)), depends on each household’s 
religious preferences. A household of religious type  K k , , 1K =  whose child attends a school with 
religious orientation 2 , 1 = j  (Catholic or non-Catholic respectively, with public schools being non-
sectarian and therefore non-Catholic) and quality  j s ~  perceives the school’s quality as follows: 
j kj kj s R s ~ =            ( 4 )  
where  0 > kj R  is a preference parameter.  
Public Schools 
The quality of the public school in district d is 
ρ ρ − =
1 ~
d d d x q s , where qd is the average income of 
households in district d with children attending this school. The public spending in education is funded by 
local property taxes, possibly aided by the state. Thus, the spending per student in district d is given by 
() d d d d d d AID n Q P t x + + = , where nd is the measure of households choosing public school in district 
                                                 
13 In this specification, peer quality captures all parental influences not mediated through school budgets that are 
positively correlated with parental income, such as parental involvement and monitoring, which have been found to 
be positively associated with education and income (McMillan (2000)). For simplicity I have assumed perfect 
correlation between peer quality and household income, although Nechyba (2000, 2003) has explored imperfect 
correlation by adding student’s ability to the peer quality measure and found his fundamental results unchanged. 
Epple and Romano (2003) model achievement as a function of own ability and school quality, which in turn depends 
on the student body’s average ability. They point out that any household variable, such as parental involvement, that 
positively affects both the child’s performance and her school conforms to their model. Through similar reasoning 
one concludes that if income measures ability, and ability affects achievement, none of this paper’s findings are 
affected by the peer quality measure. See Epple and Romano (2003b) for references to the theoretical literature that 
considers peer effects in the production of education.    11
d,  d AID  is the amount of state aid per student for district d, funded through state income tax, and Pd and 
Qd are the values of residential and non-residential district property, respectively.
14  
Private Schools 
Private schools are modeled as clubs formed by parents under an equal cost-sharing rule. Since the school 
production function in (3) creates incentives for a household to join a school with households of equal or 
higher endowment and the production of school quality features constant returns to scale, households of a 
given endowment may optimally segregate into a private school and reject lower endowment households. 
Therefore, a private school formed by households of income level yn has peer quality  n y q = .   
Households of a given endowment share costs equally at a private school. Thus, the tuition equals 
the households’ optimal spending on education, holding their residential locations fixed. That is, after 
choosing a location  ) , ( h d  with quality kdh, household n of religious type k with income yn may choose to 
send its child to a private school with tuition T and religious orientation  2 , 1 = j  (Catholic or non-
Catholic) that maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) and the perception of school 
quality 
ρ ρ − =
1
j kj x q R s , where  n y q = , and  T x j = . Notice that the optimal tuition T determined by 
solving this optimal choice problem does not depend upon Rkj.  Furthermore, private schools may 
supplement their tuition revenue with other sources. In particular, a private school of religious orientation 
j may match its tuition at the rate  j z , so that  T z x j j ) 1 ( + = . Parents who decide to open a private 
school choose the school religious orientation (Catholic or non-Catholic) that yields the higher utility. 
 
                                                 
14 For simplicity, I model non-residential property as owned by an absentee landlord who does not participate in the 
elections to set property tax rates. I further assume full capitalization of property taxes for non-residential property, 
so that the gross-of-tax rental price of non-residential property is fixed. Since the tax base includes the net-of-tax 
value of this property, my treatment captures the incentive faced by voters when taxing non-residential property.     12
Household Decision Problem 
Households are utility-maximizing agents that choose locations  ) , ( h d  and schools simultaneously, while 
taking tax rates td, district public school qualities sd, prices pdh,, and the composition of the communities as 
given. Household n chooses among all locations  ) , ( h d  in the budget set determined by the constraint 
n n y dh d p y t p t + − ≤ + ) 1 ( ) 1 ( . For each location the household compares its utility under public, Catholic, 
and non-Catholic private schools. Migrating among locations is costless in the model and the household 
may choose to live in a house other than its endowed house.  
Absolute Majority Rule Voting 
Households also vote on local property tax rates.  At the polls, households vote for property taxes taking 
their location, their choice of public or private school, property values, and the choices of others as given 
when voting on local tax rates.  Households that choose private schools vote for a tax rate of zero, 
whereas households that choose public schools vote for a nonnegative tax rate. Because voters choose the 
tax rate conditional on their school choice, taking everything else as given, their preferences over property 
tax rates are single peaked. Property tax rates are determined by majority voting as long as they at least 
support an exogenously specified spending floor  d x ; if they do not, the property tax rate is set to cover 
the spending floor, which reflects adequacy clauses in state constitutions that seek to guarantee the 
minimum spending required to provide adequate school quality.   
The state cooperates in funding public education in district d by providing an exogenous aid 
amount per student  d AID . This aid, which operates as a flat grant, is in turn funded by a state income tax 
whose rate  y t  is set to balance the state’s budget constraint. 
Equilibrium 
An equilibrium in this model specifies a partition of the population into districts and neighborhoods, local   13
property tax rates td, a state income tax ty, house prices pdh, and a partition of the population into subsets 
of households whose children attend each type of school, such that: (a) every house is occupied; (b) 
property tax rates td are consistent with majority voting by residents who choose public versus private 
school, taking their location, property values, and the choices of others as given when voting on local tax 
rates; (c) the budget balances for each district; (d) the state budget balances, and (e) at prices  pdh, 
households cannot gain utility by moving and/or changing schools.  
Though the equilibrium is proved to exist with a finite number of household types (Nechyba 
(1999)), no proof has been developed for the case of an infinite number of household types. Nonetheless, 
I have established conditions sufficient for determining whether an allocation is an equilibrium along the 
lines of the previous paragraph, and have developed an algorithm applying these conditions to compute 
the equilibrium.
15  
4. The Computational Version of the Model 
In the computational version of the model the concept of “an economy” corresponds to a metropolitan 
area, and households do not migrate across metropolitan areas. The estimation strategy involves 
computing the equilibrium for each metropolitan area at alternative parameter points to search for the 
point that minimizes a well-defined distance between the predicted equilibrium and the observed data. 
Since the equilibrium does not have an analytical solution, I solve for it through an iterative algorithm for 
                                                 
15 With a finite number of household types, the allocation of households to locations and schools is unique if the 
variation in district average housing quality is sufficiently large (Nechyba 1999). This condition is likely to hold for 
an infinite number of household types as well. Hence, for the empirical model I constructed neighborhoods so as to 
maximize such variation. Simulations have shown that the equilibrium is robust to the selection of different initial 
prices and assignments of households to locations. Although for a given variation in housing quality multiple 
equilibria are more likely when households place a sufficiently high value on school quality (i.e., high α ) or when 
peer quality is very important relative to spending (i.e., high ρ ), estimates for this model do not satisfy these 
conditions. Finally, notice that the type of equilibrium that I compute, with higher income households living in 
higher quality districts, seems to have been an empirical regularity in U.S. metropolitan areas for a number of years, 
thus becoming a reasonable focal point for estimation and policy simulations.   14
a tractable representation of each metropolitan area. Thus, this section describes the setup of districts and 
neighborhoods in this representation, the construction of household types, the state financial regime 
applied in computing the equilibrium, and the algorithm employed. 
Community Structure 
I measure the actual size of neighborhoods, districts, and metropolitan areas by the number of housing 
units. For computational tractability I aggregate the actual districts of each metropolitan area into pseudo-
districts in order to compute the equilibrium, such that the largest district is a pseudo-district in itself, 
while smaller, contiguous districts are pooled into larger units. The actual 671 districts thereby yield 58 
pseudo-districts. Figure 1 depicts Census tracts, and school districts and pseudo-districts for the Chicago 
metropolitan area. Once the pseudo-districts (henceforth called districts) are constructed, I split them into 
neighborhoods of approximately the same size, such that some districts have only one neighborhood 
while others have several. Larger metropolitan areas have larger neighborhoods. 
Neighborhood Quality Parameters 
In the theoretical model each neighborhood is composed of a set of homogeneous houses, such that 
neighborhood h in district d has a neighborhood quality index equal to kdh. Since standard datasets do not 
measure neighborhood quality, I construct an index that captures housing quality and neighborhood 
amenities, excluding public school quality. The Census geographical concept which best approximates a 
neighborhood is the Census tract. Hence, I first compute the neighborhood quality index for each Census 
tract by regressing the logarithm of tract average rental price on a set of neighborhood characteristics and 
school district fixed effects for each metropolitan area,
16 then making each tract’s neighborhood quality 
index equal to the tract's fitted rental value net of school district fixed effects. The motivation for this 
                                                 
16 I use tract average housing characteristics from the Census, and a linear and quadratic term in tract distance to the 
metropolitan area center. See Ferreyra (2002) for more details on the computation of the neighborhood quality 
parameter and for the data sources used to compute rental values and neighborhood characteristics.   15
regression is that, broadly speaking, rental prices reflect housing characteristics, neighborhood amenities, 
and public school quality. Thus, the district fixed effect nets out the school quality component from the 
measure of neighborhood quality. After obtaining the neighborhood quality index for each Census tract, I 
construct neighborhoods of the desired size by pooling contiguous tracts whose value for the 
neighborhood quality index lies in the same range. Lastly, I assign each neighborhood the median quality 
index from the neighborhood’s tracts.
17  
For an example of the final representation of a metropolitan area through pseudo-districts and 
neighborhoods, see Figure 2 for the Chicago metropolitan area. The central city of Chicago overlaps 
entirely with the central district. Unlike the suburban districts, which have one neighborhood each, the 
central district has seven neighborhoods which differ in housing quality. On average, the central district 
has the lowest housing quality in the metropolitan area, although some neighborhoods in the central 
district are of higher housing quality than others in the suburbs. 
Households 





th percentiles of the income distribution of 
households with children in public or private schools in grades 9 through 12 in each metropolitan area. 
For computational purposes, the joint distribution of housing and income endowment is as follows. At the 
beginning of the equilibrium computation, the distribution of income in each neighborhood is initially the 
same and equal to the metropolitan area’s. Hence, income and housing endowments are independently 
                                                 
17 The process of constructing pseudo-districts and neighborhoods involves the following steps: a) based on the total 
size of the metropolitan area, determine the number of equal-sized neighborhoods that yield tractable computations; 
b) find the neighborhood quality parameter for each Census tract; and c) pool contiguous tracts with similar values 
for their neighborhood quality parameters into one neighborhood, such that no actual district is split between 
neighborhoods, each neighborhood comes as close to the size determined in (a) as possible, and the central district 
remains a pseudo-district in itself. For estimation-related reasons, I organize the neighborhoods thus constructed into 
as many pseudo-districts as possible rather than having fewer pseudo-districts with many neighborhoods each.   16
distributed as are religious preferences and endowments.
18  
Recall that each household is characterized by two religious matches, one with respect to Catholic 
schools and another with respect to non-Catholic schools. If household n  is Catholic, its religious 
preferences are described by its matches with respect to Catholic and non-Catholic schools,
n
C C R , and 
n
NC C R ,  respectively; if household n is non-Catholic, its religious preferences are given by its matches with 
respect to Catholic and non-Catholic schools, 
n
C NC R ,  and 
n
NC NC R , respectively. Since there are two types of 




NC C R R  and focus on the relative valuation of Catholic schools. Unlike 
income, whose distribution comes straight from the data, the distribution of religious matches 
n
C C R ,  and 
n
C NC R ,  needs to be estimated. Therefore, I construct a discrete distribution of religious matches by 
assuming an underlying continuous distribution: I assume that 
n
C C R ,  and 
n
C NC R ,  are distributed uniformly 
over the intervals  () () () () [] δ δ + + − + 1 1 , 1 1 r r  and  () () () () [] δ δ + − − − 1 1 , 1 1 r r  respectively, where 
1 0 < < r and  1 0 < < δ . The parameter r is both the premium enjoyed by the average Catholic in a 
Catholic school, and the negative of the discount suffered by the average non-Catholic in a Catholic 
school, whereas the parameter δ is proportional to the coefficient of variation of these distributions.
19 
Finally, since households in the model also differ in their idiosyncratic preferences for locations and 
                                                 
18 For computational convenience I place a measure of households equal to ten in each (house endowment, income) 
combination. For instance, if the proportions of Catholics and non-Catholics in the metropolitan area are 28 and 72 
percent respectively, then Catholic and non-Catholic households have initial measures equal to three and seven, 
respectively, in each (house endowment, income) combination, given the lack of empirical evidence against income 
and religion being independently distributed (Ferreyra (2002)). Data on the fraction of Catholics in a metropolitan 
area come from the 1990 Church and Church Membership in America survey. 
19 To exemplify the determination of household religious matches, assume that 28% of all households are Catholic, 
r=0.2 and δ =0.1, which implies that 
n
C C R ,   and 
n
C NC R ,  are uniformly distributed between 1.08 and 1.32, and 
between 0.71 and 0.88 respectively. Hence, the first, second, and third Catholic household types have matches equal 
to 1.08, 1.20 and 1.32, and the first through seventh non-Catholic household types have matches equal to 0.72, 0.75, 
0.77, 0.80, 0.83, 0.85, and 0.88.    17
schools, I assume that ε follows a type I extreme value distribution with scale parameter 1/b, where b>0. 
Thus,  () () b F / exp exp ) ( ε ε − − = , and the variance of  ε  equals 
2 2 ) 6 / 1 ( b π .  
State Aid and Non-Residential Property 
Since the metropolitan areas included in my analysis on average fund more than two thirds of public 
school spending through local sources, it is clear that the efforts from those states to equalize spending 
across districts are quite limited. Furthermore, these metropolitan areas differ in the actual (and extremely 
complex) state formulas for the allocation of funds among districts (Hoxby (2001)), and the allocation 
process involves subtleties often unobservable to the researcher (Nechyba (2003)). Hence, I simplify by 
using the same mechanism across metropolitan areas – a local funding system with a state flat grant per 
student which may differ across districts and is equal in value to the state aid reported by the 1990 School 
District Data Book.
20 As for the non-residential property, its gross-of-tax value for a district is such that in 
the absence of property taxes, the ratio between this value and the observed value of the residential 
property tax base equals the district observed ratio of assessed non-residential to residential property.
21  
The Algorithm 
In the model, the parameter vector is  () b , , r , , , δ ρ β α θ = . Computing the equilibrium for each 
parameter point and metropolitan area is an iterative process in which households choose locations and 
schools and vote for property taxes until no household gains utility by choosing differently. The input for 
the algorithm consists of the community structure, initial distribution of household types, initial housing 
                                                 
20 Whereas the actual matching grant mechanisms in these metropolitan areas create incentives for higher property 
tax rates, the assumed flat grants have the opposite effect. However, by creating an incentive for higher property tax 
rates, non-residential property mimics the effect of matching grants. Furthermore, districts that receive large 
matching grants tend to have large stocks of non-residential property as well. 
21 I constructed the observed ratio of assessed non-residential to residential property using data from the 
Departments of Revenue of Illinois, Pennsylvania and New York, the Massachussetts Taxpayers Foundation, the 
Citizens Research Council of Michigan, and the 1987 U.S. Census of Governments.   18
prices, state aid, non-residential property and spending floor for each district. The output is the computed 
equilibrium from which I extract the variables whose predicted and observed values I match in the 
estimation (see the Appendix for further details). 
5. Estimation 
I estimate the model using a minimum distance estimator. I match the observed and simulated values of 
the following district-level variables, which I construct based on the 1990 School District Data Book: y1 = 
average household income, y2 = average housing rental value, y3 = average spending per student in public 
schools, and y4 = fraction of households with children in public schools. In addition, I match y5, the 
fraction of households with children in Catholic schools at the metropolitan area level, calculated from the 
1989 Private School Survey.
22 These variables, which are scaled to have unit variance in the sample, are 
of interest because they provide the basic characterization of household sorting across districts and 
schools, and the resulting spending in public schools. 
Let D denote the total number of districts in the sample (D=58), M the number of metropolitan 
areas (M=7), and Nj the number of observations available for variable yj,  j=1, …5, so that N1= 
N2=N3=N4=D, and N5=M. Assume that district i is located in metropolitan area m. Then, denote by Xi the 
set of exogenous variables for district i, such that i m i i x x x X − ∪ ∪ = . Here, xi is district i’s own 
exogenous data (state aid, non-residential property and spending floor, number of neighborhoods, 






th income  percentiles, and the fraction of Catholic households in the metropolitan 
area), and  i x−  is the “own” data from the other districts in metropolitan area m. In addition, the set of 
independent variables for y5m  is Xm, which is the union of all the Xi sets corresponding to the districts that 
                                                 
22 The fraction of households who reside in a district and send their children to Catholic schools is not available, 
since no data source links households’ residences with different types of private schools. However, it seems 
reasonable to assume that households with children enrolled in Catholic schools located in a given metropolitan area 
reside there, which allows me to match Catholic school enrollment at the metropolitan area level.   19
belong to metropolitan area m. Finally, let ni denote the number of housing units sampled in district i, and 
let nm denote the number of housing units sampled in metropolitan area m. 
I assume the following:  
    ( ) j 1,...N i    ; 4 ,... 1              ) , ( | = = = j X h X y E i j i ji θ     (5) 
() 1,...M m                ) , ( | 5 5 = = θ m m m X h X y E      (6) 
where the h's are implicit nonlinear functions that express the equilibrium value of each endogenous 
variable I match as a function of the exogenous data and the parameter vector θ . Since the yji’s are  
(district-level) sample means,  i jk i i i k ji n X X y y C σ = ′ ) , | , ( '  if i i ′ =    and 0 otherwise, with 
2 2 ) | ( ji i j i jj i ji n n X y V σ σ σ = = = , where  jk σ  and 
2
j σ denote population covariances and variances, 
respectively. Similarly, given that the y5m’s  are also sample means,  i j m i m ji n X X y y C 5 5 ) , | , ( σ =  if 




5 55 5 ) | ( m m m m m n n X y V σ σ σ = = = . 
Estimation Strategy 
Because the number of observations is rather small, I estimate the model using Feasible Weighted Least 
Squares to account for heteroskedasticity across observations and then use the cross-equation covariances 
to obtain correct standard errors. The first stage of Feasible Weighted Least Squares determines the value 
for θ  that minimizes the following loss function: 
      () () () ∑∑ ∑
== =











m m ij ij
j
y y y y L θ θ θ      (7) 
and the residuals from this regression are used to compute 
2 ˆ j σ  and 
2
5 ˆ σ . The second stage runs Nonlinear 
Least Squares on variables transformed to account for heteroskedasticity, and seeks to minimize the 
following loss function in the transformed variables:   20
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where * denotes division by  ji σ ˆ  or  m 5 ˆ σ . The value of θ  that minimizes this function,θ ˆ, is my estimate 
for the parameter vector. In addition to the model in Section 3, I estimate three simplified models to 
highlight the empirical richness of my theoretical framework. In particular, Model 1 excludes household 
idiosyncratic preferences (i.e., b=0) while the others include them. 
Computational Considerations 
Since Model 1 has a finite number of household types, it exhibits a coarseness that poses challenges for 
the equilibrium computation, the estimation and the fit of the data.  To estimate this model I use a refined 
grid search, which allows for the objective function to be evaluated at each parameter point independently 
of others and lends itself to the type of parallel computing that I exploit in the estimation. However, the 
disadvantage of a grid search is that the grid size grows exponentially with the number of parameters. 
Using Condor to estimate this model,
23 I evaluate the objective function at about 250 parameter points 
simultaneously using a separate processor for each point. A function evaluation takes approximately ten 
minutes on a 1 Ghz Intel processor, and the full two-stage procedure takes about a week. 
  In contrast, the presence of an infinite number of household types in Models 2, 3 and 4 facilitates 
the computation of the equilibrium and the estimation of the model, for which I employ a cyclical 
coordinate descent algorithm (Bertsekas (1995)). A function evaluation takes about forty seconds. 
Furthermore, the full estimation takes between one and two days in a 3 Ghz Intel processor and can be run 
on a desktop, which is a clear simplification over Model 1.
24 
                                                 
23 A project of the Computer Science Department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Condor is a software 
system harnessing the power of a cluster of UNIX workstations on a network (http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor).  
24 In Model 1 the loss function is discontinuous because of the discreteness of household types and the presence of a 
median voter in each district. However, a sufficiently large number of household types and school districts would 
yield a smooth objective function. Although majority voting still generates some minor discontinuity in the objective   21
Identification 
The model is identified if no two distinct parameter points generate the same equilibrium for each 
metropolitan area. A sufficient condition for local identification is that the matrix of first derivatives of 
the predicted variables with respect to the parameter vector has full column rank when evaluated at the 
true parameter points, a condition which requires sufficient variation in the exogenous variables across 
districts and metropolitan areas. Evaluated at my parameter estimates, the matrices of first derivatives of 
the estimated models have full column rank in my sample. 
  Although a change in one parameter produces changes in several endogenous variables given the 
nature of the model, one can still identify the first-order effects from varying each parameter. A higher 
coefficient on school quality in the utility function (α ) implies higher educational spending and lower 
housing prices, and a higher coefficient on consumption (β ) implies higher household consumption and 
lower housing prices. A higher elasticity of school quality with respect to peer quality (ρ ) lowers the 
importance of spending in the production of school quality, hence lowering spending. Furthermore, a 
higher ρ  makes households more willing to segregate themselves by forming private schools.  
An increase in the Catholic school premium (r) raises the relative valuation of Catholic schools 
among Catholics yet lowers it among non-Catholics. If r=0, then Catholics have the same preferences as 
non-Catholics and households sort themselves across private school types randomly. The greater the value 
of r, the higher the fraction of Catholic school enrollment accounted for by Catholics. An increase in δ  
raises the variation around the mean religious match among Catholics and non-Catholics. As δ  rises, more 
Catholics come to prefer non-Catholic over Catholic schools and the reverse happens to non-Catholics. In 
particular, the identification of r and δ   is largely driven by the variation in religious affiliation and 
Catholic school enrollment across metropolitan areas. Finally, an increase in the value of the variance of 
                                                                                                                                                             
function for Models 2, 3 and 4, a sufficiently large number of districts would yield a completely smooth function. 
For the sake of computing standard errors, I proceed as if I had good approximations to the continuous functions and 
rely on numerical derivatives.   22
idiosyncratic preferences (b) strengthens the role of idiosyncratic preferences in household location and 
school choice. When b=0, households’ choices are only determined by their wealth and their religious 
preferences; when b is sufficiently large, household choices are only determined by their idiosyncratic 
preferences, which results in a random sorting of households across locations and schools. 
6. Estimation Results 
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the estimated models, each of which is discussed in turn 
below. I present three simplified models before turning to the most general formulation, which 
corresponds to the model in Section 3. Model 1 excludes household idiosyncratic preferences for 
locations and schools, non-residential property and spending floor in public schools, and assumes a zero 
subsidy rate for Catholic schools. Catholic school enrollment in this model is mostly driven by the 
heterogeneity of preferences for Catholic schools parameterized through r and δ . In this model, when 
faced with the choice between schools that are identical in everything except religious orientation, at least 
some Catholics would choose non-Catholic schools if  ) 1 /( r r + > δ , whereas at least some non-Catholics 
would choose Catholic schools if  ) 1 /( r r − > δ . The parameter estimates for this model generate 
sufficient overlap that Catholics may enroll in non-Catholic schools and vice versa. These estimates also 
lead to the rejection of the hypothesis that Catholics’ and non-Catholics’ preferences for Catholic schools 
follow the same distribution,
25 hence predicting that most of the equilibrium Catholic school enrollment 
proceeds from Catholic households. For example, in the non-voucher equilibrium for Chicago, 84 percent 
of the Catholic school enrollment is accounted for by Catholic households, a prediction that squares very 
well with the observed religious composition of Catholic schools (see Section 2).  
Although the parameter estimates are highly significant, largely as a result of fitting sample 
means from Census data based on thousands of observations, the fit of the data displays some 
                                                 
25 Interestingly, when Model 1 is estimated without including household religious preferences or religious schools, 
the point estimate for ρ   is higher as it captures all factors different from spending which lead to the formation of 
private schools, including preferences for religious education. See Ferreyra (2002).   23
shortcomings. First, only districts with variation in housing quality (i.e., with more than one 
neighborhood) exhibit any variation in predicted household income and school choices. Hence, this model 
is not capable of replicating the observed private school enrollment in suburban districts, which have only 
one neighborhood in my representation. Second, Model 1 faces problems at matching the observed public 
school spending. In particular, in the central districts the predicted average household income and 
property values are sufficiently low that it is optimal for residents to vote for a property tax rate of zero 
and have public schools funded exclusively through state aid.  
  In order to explore the role of idiosyncratic preferences, Model 2 builds on Model 1 by adding 
these preferences for location and school type. Thus, in Model 2 households sort themselves across 
locations and schools based not only on their income and religious preferences, but also on their 
idiosyncratic tastes. Hence, in equilibrium all districts attract households of varying incomes who make 
heterogeneous school choices. This, in turn, facilitates the fit of private school enrollment in suburban 
districts and of other variables as well. However, perhaps not surprisingly, the addition of a second type 
of household preference heterogeneity results in reduced precision for the estimates of parameters 
characterizing private school enrollment, ρ , r and δ . While Model 2 fits private school and Catholic 
school enrollment better than Model 1, it does so almost solely on the basis of idiosyncratic preferences. 
Furthermore, a consequence of r not being significantly different from zero is that Catholics attend 
Catholic schools at the same rate as non-Catholics. This result counters the empirical evidence that 85 
percent of Catholic school students come from Catholic households (see Section 2) and reveals Model 2’s 
failure to capture an essential feature of private school markets – namely, who chooses which type of 
private school. Hence, in Model 4 I exploit additional information that permits more precise estimation of 
the parameters associated with private school enrollment. 
Model 3 generalizes Model 2 to better reflect the environment in which educational expenditures 
are determined. First, it incorporates the non-residential property tax base, which is particularly important 
in central cities. Second, it reflects the recognition that state constitutional requirements for provision of 
education place an effective minimum on expenditure per student. Since constitutions do not state a   24
minimum in explicit dollar terms, I use the empirical approach of finding a minimum expenditure level 
based on fit to the data. This leads to a choice of a spending floor equal to 60 percent of a district’s 
observed spending. Third, it incorporates tuition subsidies received by Catholic school students. In the 
central district, the best-fitting subsidy rate is 100 percent, though the results are not substantially affected 
by the choice of a lower subsidy rate.
26 The resulting Model 3 fits the data better than Model 2, 
particularly with regards to spending. 
Turning to Model 4, I improve the precision of the estimates of the parameters characterizing 
preferences for Catholic schools by requiring that the weighted average percent of Catholic in Catholic 
schools be equal to the observed national average of 0.85 as data on the religious composition of Catholic 
schools are not available at the metropolitan area level. I do this through the following iterative 
procedure: (1) fixing r, find the remaining parameters that minimize the objective function; (2) fixing the 
remaining parameters, update r to replicate the observed national average of .85; repeat steps (1) and (2) 
until all the parameter values converge. Since Model 4 contains the most general formulation of the 
theoretical model, I use its parameter estimates hereafter.  
Analyzing the fit of the individual variables 
Figures 3a through 3e depict the predicted and observed values for each variable. Overall, the model fits 
the data reasonably well, particularly for the central districts and the largest metropolitan areas. 
Furthermore, rank-order correlation analyses reveal the model’s ability to replicate the observed district 
rankings within metropolitan areas. This relatively good fit is an encouraging result given the 
parsimonious parameterization of the model, the aggregation into pseudo-districts and the coarse 
                                                 
26 I explored a number of generalizations to address the misfit of spending besides the one featured here, such as 
district variation in the number of public school children per household based on Census data, and different levels 
for the spending floor. For the chosen floor, the predicted spending in the city of Chicago is approximately equal to 
eighty percent of the observed one.  Although the national average subsidy rate in Catholic high schools is about 40 
percent (National Catholic Educational Association (1990a)), subsidies are heavily based on need, leading to the 
expectation that a substantially higher one prevails in the city.    25
discretization of the distributions of income and religious preferences. 
  The presence of idiosyncratic preferences, non-residential property, spending floor, and Catholic 
school subsidies lead to reasonably good predictions for private school enrollment (Fig. 3a), although the 
truncation of my five-point income distribution at the 90
th percentile of income prevents greater predicted 
enrollment rates in the wealthiest districts. The model fits district average household income and rental 
value well (Figs. 3b and 3c, respectively), thus replicating sorting patterns across jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, the model tends to under predict rental value. While this might be partly due to limitations 
of the neighborhood quality parameters, which do not include a number of actual physical neighborhood 
amenities, it also points to the possibility that housing prices may reflect neighborhood demographic 
composition above and beyond public school peer quality. The generalizations made on the spending side 
have helped fit public school spending reasonably well (Fig. 3d). The fact that the observed spending in 
the central cities of Pittsburgh, Boston and St. Louis rank almost at the top of their respective spending 
distributions is not replicated by the model. It suggests that additional factors such as details of the state 
aid allocation and interjurisdictional productivity differences in public schools may be important. Finally, 
Catholic school enrollment is particularly well fitted for New York, Chicago and Detroit (Fig. 3e).  
Table 4 shows the correlations between the matched variables, both for the observed and fitted 
values. The correlations for fitted values resemble the actual correlations reasonably well. Hence, while 
acknowledging the limitations in the fit of the data and considering them informative for future 
extensions, I view the evidence presented here as indicative that the model successfully captures the 
patterns observed in the data.  
7. Simulating Private School Vouchers 
I simulate two types of voucher programs for the Chicago metropolitan area. The first type is a universal 
voucher program in which every household is eligible for a voucher that may be used for any type of 
private school. The second program (“non-sectarian vouchers”) differs in that the voucher may only be 
used for non-Catholic schools. In either program, households may supplement the voucher with additional   26
payments towards tuition but cannot retain the difference when the tuition is lower than the voucher level. 
Consequently, the tuition is never set below the voucher level. 
Furthermore, the voucher level, ν , is set exogenously by the state in these simulations. Since 
vouchers are funded through a state income tax, the state income tax has to fund both the flat grants for 
public school students and the vouchers for private school students. Moreover, during the policy 
simulations, household n’s budget constraint differs from the one given in (2) as follows: 
() n n y dh d p y t v T p t c + − = − + + + ) 1 ( 0 , max   ) 1 (      (9) 
Notice that when forming private schools, households choose their optimal tuition taking into 
consideration voucher availability and dollar amount. Other things equal, vouchers lead to a higher tuition 
and school quality level while reducing the share of tuition paid by parents. Since it is not clear how 
donors to Catholic schools might respond to vouchers, I assume that the total tuition subsidy for urban 
Catholic schools provided in the non-voucher equilibrium remains constant throughout the simulations, 
which means that the subsidy per child may rise or decline depending on enrollment. In addition, an 
important issue concerns the benchmark equilibrium self-selection of households into locations and 
schools. For instance, a household with a high idiosyncratic preference for Catholic urban schools who 
chooses to live in the city and send their children to Catholic schools may respond differently to vouchers 
than an otherwise identical household with different idiosyncratic preferences who chooses suburban 
public schools. The Appendix provides details on the treatment of self-selection. 
Before discussing the outcomes of the simulations, the benchmark equilibrium, which is the 
equilibrium simulated using the parameter estimates for a non-voucher regime, must be discussed. The 
first column of Tables 5a and 5b report the data, whereas the second column presents the benchmark 
equilibrium. In addition, Figure 4 depicts the geographic distribution of income, rental value, private 
school enrollment and public school spending in the benchmark equilibrium, which reasonably mirror the 
data. In particular, the simulated benchmark equilibrium correctly predicts that urban public schools have 
the lowest spending and peer quality in the metropolitan area. Furthermore, the benchmark equilibrium   27
captures the fact that private school enrollment rates are higher in the city than in the suburbs. It also 
predicts that urban private school attendees reside in the central district’s best neighborhoods, whose low 
tax-inclusive housing prices reflect the district’s low public school quality. On average, private school 
households are wealthier and have a stronger preference for Catholic schools than public school 
households. Most private school attendees are enrolled in Catholic schools, whose students are primarily 
Catholic, whereas public and private non-Catholic school students are mainly non-Catholic. 
Universal Vouchers  
Below I analyze the effects of universal vouchers on school choices, residential decisions, and school 
quality in both public and private schools. In addition, I discuss the welfare implications of universal 
voucher policies and provide some perspective on my findings. 
Household Sorting across Schools and Jurisdictions under Universal Vouchers 
Table 5a presents some results from the simulation of universal vouchers for $1,000, $3,000, $5,000 and 
$7,000.
27 Private school enrollment grows with the voucher amount, and reaches a maximum of 0.74 of 
the entire population for a $7,000-voucher. Voucher availability gives rise to both new Catholic and 
private non-Catholic schools yet the private school market share for Catholic schools decreases with the 
voucher level. Furthermore, universal vouchers enable more households to attend the type of school that 
best suits their preferences. Thus, Catholic schools attract an increasing number of non-Catholics with a 
preference for Catholic schools, while non-Catholic schools capture fewer Catholics.  
Figure 5 depicts household sorting across public, Catholic and private non-Catholic schools for 
selected universal and non-sectarian voucher levels. Since the majority of households enjoy a spending 
per student above $1,000 in the absence of vouchers, only households who can supplement a low voucher 
                                                 
27 Notice that voucher amounts are up to $4,300, $2,700, $5,900 and $7,500 for the Florida, Cleveland, Milwaukee 
and D.C. programs respectively. Meanwhile, per pupil spending in those places is approximately equal to $7,500, 
$11,000, $11,000, and $12,000, respectively. See www.ij.org and www.heritage.org.     28
take it, and most of them already attend private schools in the benchmark equilibrium. Higher voucher 
levels, however, appeal both to low-income households in urban public schools, and to middle- and high-
income households in suburban public schools.  
The majority of voucher users are urban residents before vouchers, yet between 10 and 15 percent 
are suburbanites who move into the city. These migrants are middle- and high-income households with 
children in suburban public schools who move to the central district because of its relatively low tax-
inclusive property values and choose private schools. Hence, vouchers attenuate the residential 
stratification generated by the residence-based public school system as they break the bundling of 
residence and public schools. Since tax-inclusive property values continue to be relatively high in the 
suburbs given their spending floors, the effect persists as the voucher grows. Interestingly, voucher 
availability reduces the housing premium in the best school districts but raises it in the locations favored 
by voucher users, thus causing capital losses or gains, respectively, to those homeowners.
28  
Vouchers also induce migration from the city to the suburbs on the part of households who seek 
private schools and better housing after reaping capital gains in the city. Although a quarter of voucher 
users remain in the suburbs, an increasing fraction relocates across them. Furthermore, private schools 
progressively spread to the suburbs, although the presence of non-residential property and high spending 
floors keep property tax rates relatively high and maintain high-quality public schools. Not surprisingly, 
private schools appear last in the best school districts. 
While vouchers bring higher income households to the city, suburban districts with good housing 
yet low public school quality also attract wealthier voucher users. In addition, the greater affordability of 
districts with the best public schools appeals to wealthy households who strongly prefer public schools. 
Furthermore, the largest capital gains accrue to homeowners in the best urban neighborhoods and in the 
suburban districts chosen by voucher users. Although suburban locations lose property value with low 
vouchers, some of them gain for sufficiently high vouchers when majorities choose private schools, thus 
                                                 
28 See Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer (2001) for empirical evidence that homeowners in good public school districts 
are less likely to vote in favor of universal vouchers.   29
lowering the property tax burden and further attracting households who bid up rental values.  
Whether or not vouchers have the ability to improve school quality for the low-income segment 
of the population is an important policy issue. Most low-income households, which are taken to include 
those with an income less than or equal to $20,000, need a relatively high voucher amount to compensate 
for the good public school peers they would lose in a private school and the spending per student they 
might forego. Yet half of the low-income segment takes up a $3,000-voucher and vouchers above $1,000 
are used at a higher rate among these households than in the rest of the population. Encouraged by tuition 
subsidies, they also attend Catholic schools at higher rates. 
With the expansion in the use of vouchers, funded by the state, fiscal burdens progressively shift 
from district property taxes onto the state income tax. While the average property tax rate falls with the 
increasing number of voters who favor zero property taxes, the income tax rate rises as the net outcome of 
lower state aid expense for public schools and higher voucher expense for private schools.  
Universal Voucher Effects on School Quality 
By affecting household residential and school choices, vouchers affect the quality of public and private 
schools as the evolution of school quality indicators shows in Table 5b. Most households gain school 
quality for vouchers of at least $3,000. Average school quality declines slightly for low voucher amounts 
but rises for larger ones; under a $7000-voucher the average school quality is 11 percent higher than in 
the benchmark equilibrium, a gain of 2.1 percent of the average household endowment. At the same time, 
the variation in spending and school quality rises for vouchers up to $5,000 and then falls for larger 
vouchers as private schools converge to a tuition equal to the voucher. The variation in peer quality 
experienced by students, however, grows as the educational system becomes increasingly private. 
Behind this aggregate pattern lie remarkable differences across public and private schools. The 
public schools that remain open are the best ones, which accounts for the rising public school indicators. 
Average private school indicators, on the other hand, first drop as households with an income lower than 
the original private school population take up the voucher and then rise as wealthier households do so.   30
Furthermore, vouchers affect public schools through multiple channels. For instance, property tax rates 
fall as a greater number of voters choose a zero-property tax rate, and the value of the residential property 
tax base falls in several districts with the decline in demand for their public schools yet rises in other 
locations favored by voucher users. Moreover, higher spending per student may result even in the 
presence of a lower property tax base because fewer children need support in public schools. 
These various forces, in turn, play out differently across school districts. For urban public 
schools, spending initially falls with the substantially lower property tax rate induced by vouchers but 
then rises when the effect of the lower public school enrollment prevails and leads to a higher per-student 
property tax revenue, particularly from non-residential sources. In suburban schools, the declining public 
school enrollment raises per-student property tax revenue until private schools comprise the majority of 
district voters, at which point the effect of the lower tax rate prevails. Moreover, voucher impact on public 
school peer quality also varies widely across districts. For instance, districts with the lowest benchmark 
equilibrium peer quality further lose good peers, whereas the reverse takes place in districts with the 
highest peer quality, whose declining housing prices entice wealthier households.  
To evaluate how school quality gains and losses are distributed in the population, Figure 6 depicts 





th percentile endowments in the benchmark 
and universal voucher equilibria. Not surprisingly, school quality is increasing in endowment in all 
scenarios, yet converges across endowments as the voucher grows to cover most of the tuition payment. 
Vouchers below $5,000 mainly favor –albeit modestly- middle and high-income households with the 
ability to supplement the voucher. In contrast, higher vouchers favor households below the 75
th percentile 
endowment though they slightly damage those above, who are affected by the growing income tax burden 
and often attend declining public schools. Yet the greatest gains for sufficiently large vouchers accrue to 
households with an approximate endowment of $35,000. These households attend urban public schools in 
the benchmark equilibrium and mix with lower-wealth peers but then access higher quality schools, either 
by moving to suburban districts with better public schools or by switching into private schools.    31
Low-income voucher users gain spending with sufficiently high vouchers yet always lose peer 
quality. In this segment, school quality losses peak for the $3,000-voucher, which causes the loss of a 
significant number of good peers to those who remain in public schools yet is not high enough to match 
the pre-voucher quality for those who switch into private schools. Hence, only a voucher larger than the 
benchmark equilibrium spending per student in urban schools ($4,300 in these simulations) yields school 
quality gains for all low-income voucher users. These gains are sizeable (12 and 44 percent on average 
for $5,000 and $7,000-vouchers, respectively), and are even larger for Catholic school students. 
Welfare Implications of Universal Vouchers 
Among the most relevant issues concerning vouchers is who wins or loses when they are introduced. As 
Table 5b shows, the majority of the population benefits, slightly, from $1,000-vouchers, whereas just 
below half gains from larger voucher amounts (compensating variation measures welfare gains). 
Furthermore, the average welfare gain reaches a maximum at $237 for $3,000-vouchers and a minimum 
at -$1,040 for $7,000-vouchers. These outcomes, in absolute value equal to 0.5 and 2 percent of the 
average household endowment, respectively, show that the average welfare gains are relatively small, 
although the distributional effects are large. For instance, while the average winner may reap gains of up 
to 3 percent, the average loser may suffer losses of up to 5 percent. In these simulations the average 
winner is less wealthy yet more strongly prefers Catholic education than the average loser. Wealthy 
households, who already enjoy high school quality before vouchers, tend to lose under high voucher 
levels regardless of their school choices due to their high income tax burden and capital losses. Moreover, 
households who remain in public schools make up the largest fraction of welfare-losing households for 
vouchers below $7,000 despite the school quality gains attained by many of them. 
While more households reap school quality gains as the voucher grows, fewer experience welfare 
gains. Furthermore, winners at low voucher levels are less likely to gain school quality than losers, a fact 
which is reversed at high voucher levels. Although seemingly counterintuitive, these findings simply 
highlight the multiplicity of channels that give rise to welfare changes: low vouchers mostly lead to   32
savings in school or tax-inclusive housing spending that allow for greater consumption, which in turn 
brings forth welfare gains, whereas high vouchers yield school quality gains as well.  
The top row of Figure 7 provides additional insights into the distributional effects of universal 
vouchers. On average, welfare gains are decreasing in endowment, yet households with the strongest 
preference for Catholic schools experience the largest gains at each wealth level. In addition, the large 
fiscal cost of the $7,000-voucher is evidenced by the fact that all households gain less for $7,000 than for 
$5,000-vouchers. A salient outcome is that the greatest relative welfare gains accrue to low-income 
households, who reap average gains between 2 and 3 percent of their wealth. Furthermore, low-income 
households benefit from vouchers at a higher rate than the rest of the population, and virtually all voucher 
users in this segment experience welfare gains. With small vouchers, low-income households reap 
consumption gains from lower property taxes in the central district although their urban public schools 
lose quality; with large vouchers they experience both consumption and school quality gains. 
Further Issues 
While an important aspect of vouchers is their ability to expand household residential and school choices, 
thus unleashing a variety of equilibrium effects, one might worry that the absence of moving costs in the 
model over predicts relocations and their associated effects. To provide some perspective on this issue, I 
simulated universal and non-sectarian voucher programs without allowing household relocation.
29 Since 
most voucher users relocate under full mobility, private school formation is slower now and heavily 
concentrated in the central district regardless of the voucher amount. Due to the lower voucher user rate, 
urban public schools keep their good peers yet lose spending at higher rates by foregoing the increase in 
property values induced by immigrants under full mobility. Moreover, the reduction in property tax rates 
leads to lower public school spending yet is not large enough to yield welfare gains through greater 
                                                 
29 Detailed results for these simulations are available from the author upon request.   33
consumption. Overall, lack of mobility, which may be viewed as a short-run constraint, leads to fewer 
households experiencing school quality and welfare gain. 
One might also wonder how much of the voucher effects described for the full mobility case are 
associated with the greater residential and school choice set afforded by vouchers, and how much with the 
mere increase in public spending for education. To investigate the normative effects of vouchers per se, I 
simulated an increase in per pupil state aid of equal dollar amount for each district, whose equilibrium 
total state expense equals that under vouchers. The greater state aid crowds out property tax effort on the 
part of suburban districts, which end up with almost the same levels of spending and quality. However, it 
significantly increases spending in the central district, where property taxes grow in response to a 
wealthier electorate and a greater public school enrollment associated with the improved public schools. 
Nonetheless, the higher property tax burden overwhelms the school quality gains for urban households, in 
contrast with the welfare-enhancing reduction in property tax burden under vouchers. The increase in 
state aid, which effectively reduces the variation in spending across districts by benefiting the central 
district proportionally the most, motivates less relocation than the voucher as it eliminates much of the 
property tax incentive to migrate across locations. By favoring public schools, this policy also leads to 
fewer households attending their optimal type of school and to current and former private school 
attendees losing the most welfare of all households. The combination of higher property tax burden for 
urban households and fewer school choices leads to only 12 percent of the population benefiting from this 
policy, as opposed to 43 percent that gains from the $5,000-voucher. 
Finally, I investigated the robustness of the Chicago findings by simulating both voucher 
programs for the New York metropolitan area. While the qualitative results are similar, the main 
differences are centered on the fact that New York City accounts for 70 percent of the metropolitan area 
whereas Chicago comprises about 50 percent. Since the central district is larger in New York, public 
school attendees come from more varied income levels. Hence, proportionally more households benefit 
from the opportunity to segregate into private schools and the largest school quality gains accrue to 
households at the median rather than the 30
th percentile of the endowment distribution. The larger central   34
district also creates more opportunities for the establishment of private schools in the city’s best 
neighborhoods and also generates property tax savings to more households. The combination of greater 
opportunities for school quality improvement and property tax savings yields welfare gains to the 
majority of the population at every voucher amount in New York. This contrasts with Chicago and warns 
against generalized conclusions regarding the political support for vouchers. 
Non-sectarian vouchers 
Non-sectarian vouchers raise the price of Catholic schools relative to non-Catholic private schools, thus 
inducing some households, depending on their religious preferences and budget constraints, to substitute 
non-Catholic private schools for Catholic schools. Tables 5a and 5b compare the results of universal and 
non-sectarian vouchers. Non-sectarian vouchers induce less private school enrollment than universal 
vouchers precisely because many households that would use a universal voucher would choose Catholic 
schools. Furthermore, under non-sectarian vouchers fewer households than in the benchmark equilibrium 
choose their optimal school type. Whereas enrollment grows in all private schools under universal 
vouchers, it now rises at private non-Catholic schools but falls at Catholic schools, since only households 
with a high taste for Catholic schools and the ability to pay for them remain (see the third row of Figure 
5). Nonetheless, the enrollment losses in Catholic schools are tempered by the existence of tuition 
subsidies in urban Catholic schools, and Catholic schools’ share falls from 11 percent of the total 
enrollment in the benchmark equilibrium to 6 percent under the $7,000-voucher, with most of this decline 
occurring for high vouchers.  
Since both universal and non-sectarian vouchers subsidize private school attendance, they 
produce some qualitatively similar effects. They induce residential changes and generate comparable 
effects on property values. In addition, they have a similar impact on school quality and public schools. 
Both programs progressively shift the fiscal burden towards the state income tax, thus redistributing 
income from the wealthy to the poor. The combination of a higher fiscal burden, capital losses, and   35
relatively small gains in school quality makes the average loser wealthier than the average winner in both 
programs, and households who remain in public schools after vouchers comprise the largest fraction of 
losing households. Moreover, households at the 30
th percentile wealth reap the largest school quality gains 
in the two programs while low-income households enjoy the largest welfare gains.  
Despite these similarities, universal and non-sectarian vouchers differ in other important ways. 
Fewer households attain school quality gains under non-sectarian vouchers, and urban schools experience 
greater losses because public school enrollment does not fall enough to offset the declining property tax 
rate while property values do not grow enough to raise spending. More low-income households use a 
universal than a non-sectarian voucher given the financial incentive to attend Catholic schools. 
Furthermore, a greater number of low-income households gain school quality through universal vouchers 
– this is true for both voucher users and non-users. Hence, a non-sectarian program seeking to match the 
universal vouchers’ success at increasing school quality for the low-income segment needs to provide a 
more generous voucher.  
The two voucher programs also differ in private school location patterns. Since fewer households 
compete for urban housing under non-sectarian vouchers, a greater fraction of non-sectarian private 
schools locate in the city and no new Catholic school opens in the suburbs. At low voucher levels, fewer 
users originally come from the city, given that urban Catholic school attendees cannot use the voucher 
and low-income households cannot supplement it. 
Moreover, universal and non-sectarian vouchers have different welfare implications. For instance, 
the average welfare gain is higher for universal vouchers below $7,000, and households benefit from 
$1,000- and $5,000-universal vouchers at a higher rate.
30 While at each endowment level Catholic 
households gain the most, they lose the most under non-Catholic vouchers of at least $5,000 (see the 
                                                 
30 The average welfare gain and the percent of winners from a non-sectarian $7,000-voucher are higher than for a 
$7,000-universal voucher because the lower adoption rate of the non-sectarian voucher imposes a lower fiscal 
burden. Although more households gain from a non-sectarian than a universal $3000-voucher, the difference in 
welfare gains is negligible for the households who win with non-sectarian yet lose with universal vouchers.   36
bottom row of Figure 7). Although most households either gain or lose in both programs, about 15 
percent of all households gain from high universal yet lose from non-sectarian vouchers. These 
households, who either attend Catholic schools in the benchmark equilibrium or would choose them 
through universal vouchers, now turn to public or private non-Catholic schools for sufficiently high 
vouchers. With welfare outcomes that differ by 5 percent of their wealth across voucher regimes, these 
households are, not surprisingly, those whose welfare is most affected by the choice of voucher 
program.
31 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Few policies are as controversial in the United States as private school vouchers. Although no large-scale 
voucher program has been implemented to date, one can learn about their potential effects through policy 
simulation within a general equilibrium framework. Thus, in this paper I estimate a general equilibrium 
model with multiple public school districts and private schools and use the parameter estimates to 
simulate voucher programs. An important contribution in this paper is the inclusion of religious schools 
and household religious and idiosyncratic preferences, which has enabled me to compare the effects of 
universal vouchers with vouchers restricted to non-sectarian schools in the Chicago metropolitan area. 
Whereas the two programs give rise to some similar effects, the evolution of the private school market 
differs in each case. In addition, fewer people, particularly from the lower-income segment of the 
population, benefit from non-sectarian vouchers. While those with the strongest preference for Catholic 
education gain the most under universal vouchers, they lose the most under non-sectarian vouchers. 
The fact that households who care the most about religious education are the ones who lose the 
most in a non-sectarian program may seem an obvious result, and a skeptical reader may question its 
                                                 
31 The Catholic Church has publicly stated its full support of unrestricted parental choice programs and specifically 
advocates against the exclusion of religious schools from voucher programs. See, for instance, 
http://www.usccb.org/bishops, http://www.ncea.org/publicpolicy/policystatements, and http://www.flacathconf.org. 
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usefulness. However, it is important to bear in mind the tradition in the United States federal 
jurisprudence that upholds parents’ right to choose the type of education they want for their children – 
including, of course, religious education (see Viteritti (1999) and the references therein). Moreover, the 
US Supreme Court upheld the Cleveland voucher program as “entirely neutral with respect to religion” 
and as a “program of true private choice” (Zelman v Simmons-Harris (2002), p. 2473). An outcome of 
this decision was the enactment of the first federally funded voucher program in the District of Columbia, 
which started in the 2004/05 academic year, and the proposed Choice Incentive Fund for the 2005/06 
fiscal year to enable other cities to develop parental choice programs. At the state level, however, the role 
of Blaine amendments in court battles continues to raise questions on the consequences of excluding 
religious schools from voucher programs. Besides providing tools for answering these questions, this 
paper’s framework is appropriate to analyze other relevant issues such as voucher targeting and child-
centered funding, the expansion of current voucher programs, and the potential effect of voucher 
proposals originating in the last five years but not yet implemented.
32 
While powerful, this framework certainly leaves room for important extensions such as the 
refinement of neighborhood quality measures, the inclusion of preferences for neighborhood demographic 
composition and of neighborhood schools, the distinction between renters and owners, and the 
introduction of households without school-age children. As more data become available on private 
schools, exploring private schools’ pricing schemes and their productivity relative to the public sector 
should also prove worthwhile. Although no simulation exercise will be able to replace the actual 
enactment of a large-scale voucher program, developing and estimating general equilibrium models of 
local jurisdictions that incorporate private school markets can still shed much light on the potential 
outcomes of school choice programs. 
                                                 
32 Between 2000 and 2005, thirty-nine states including California, New York and Texas have considered enacting 
voucher programs, and the legislatures of Wisconsin and Ohio are currently studying expansions to their programs 
in Milwaukee and Cleveland, respectively. While this paper analyzes vouchers for K-12 education, vouchers are 
also being used for pre-kindergarten in Louisiana and Florida. See www.heritage.org.   38
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TABLE 1 























Boston, MA   2,871  87 .158  .49  .72 
Chicago, IL   6,070  50 .472  .41  .68 
Detroit, MI   4,382  110 .261  .35  .78 
New York-Long Island, NY   11,156  167 .644  .43  .76 
Philadelphia, PA—NJ  4,857  106 .315  .34  .57 
Pittsburgh, PA   2,057  80 .141  .47  .63 
St. Louis, MO-IL   2,444  71 .146  .26  .65 
 
Secondary and Unified School Districts included. District Relative Size = number of housing units in 
district / number of housing units in metropolitan area. Share of local sources for public school funding is 
the district average share in each metropolitan area. 
Source: 1990 Census and School District Data Book (SDDB), and 1990 Churches and Church 




School Districts in Selected Metropolitan Areas: Summary Statistics 
 






Fall Enrollment   1,988  10,741  115  10,698 
No. Households  1,970  11,829  37  10,619 
Fraction of hhs. w/ children in private schools  .112  .082  .000  .357 
In Central District  .194  .051  .097  .268 
Avg. Household Income ($)–All Households 63,589  27,985  24,066  169,457 
Hhs. w/ Children in Public Schools  60,496  25,363  23,690  154,423 
Hhs. w/ Children in Private Schools  84,736  54,219  19,664  297,177 
Avg. Housing Rental Value ($)–All Households 13,525  8,007  3,499  40,349 
Hhs. w/ Children in Public Schools   13,156  7,785  3,453  39,867 
Hhs. w/ Children in Private Schools  16,159  9,775  2,905  46,656 
Avg. Spending per Student in Public Schools ($)  7,674  3,987  3,221  22,500 
District Size Relative to Metro Area   .010  .036  .000  .141 
Share of Local (District) Revenues for Pub. Sch.  .697  .193  .186  .989 
Share of State Revenues  .276  .177  .007  .697 
Non-Residential Property Value / Resid. Prop.Value  .457  .518  .000  2.651 
       In Central District  1.181  0.535  .678  2.146 
 
No. observations: 671 school districts - Household data and Fall enrollment are for grades 9 through 12. 
District size = number of housing units in the district / number of housing units in the metropolitan area.  
Source: 1990 SDDB and 1989 Common Core of Data. Non-residential property sources: see Section 4.   41
TABLE  3 
Parameter Estimates 
 









































































714.460 255.581  225.953 244.215 
 
Standard Errors in parentheses. Number of observations: see section 5.  
Sum of Squared Residuals uses second-stage weights from Model 3. Unweighted Sum of Squared 
Residuals uses no weights. Ranking of models by sum of squared residuals is robust to the use of weights 




Goodness of Fit : Some Correlations  
 
a. Observed Data 







Average Hh. Income  1       
Average Rental Value  0.98  1     
Spending per Student  0.52  0.61  1   
Fraction Public  0.25  0.21  -0.13  1 
 
b. Fitted Data 







Average Hh. Income  1       
Average Rental Value  0.88  1     
Spending per Student  0.74  0.57  1   
Fraction  Public  0.46 0.31 0.73  1 
 
Number of observations: 58 districts. Weighted correlations - weight: district measure of households.  42
TABLE 5a 
Universal and Non-Catholic Vouchers in Chicago:  School Choice, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects 
 
  B.E.  Universal Voucher Amount  Non-Catholic Voucher Amount
  Data (1)  $1,000 $3,000 $5,000 $7,000 $1,000 $3,000 $5,000 $7,000
Private School Enrollment             
Fraction Households in Private Schools  0.16 0.16 0.22 0.43 0.60 0.74 0.19 0.29 0.48 0.62 
Fraction Hhs. in Catholic Schools w.r.t. Private Schools  0.84 0.72 0.69 0.61 0.55 0.50 0.60 0.34 0.17 0.11 
Fraction Private Schools Hhs. in Central District  0.61 0.72 0.72 0.75 0.64 0.55 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.60 
School Choice before and after Vouchers             
Fraction Hhs. choosing Public-Public (2)      0.78 0.57 0.41 0.26 0.81 0.71 0.52 0.37 
Fraction Hhs. choosing Public-Private      0.06 0.27 0.43 0.58 0.03 0.13 0.33 0.47 
Fraction Hhs. choosing Private-Public      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fraction Hhs. choosing Private-Private      0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 
Fraction Hhs. choosing Catholic-Catholic      0.11 0.11 0.11 0  .11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 
Fraction Hhs. choosing Catholic-Non-Catholic      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 
Fraction Hhs. in Optimal School Type (3)    0.68 0.70 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65 
Religious Composition of Public and Private Schools             
Catholic Schools: fraction of Catholic students    0.86 0.83 0.85 0.75 0.73 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.87 
Private Non-Catholic Schools: fraction non-Catholic students    0.67 0.69 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.63 
Public Schools: fraction of Catholic students    0.34 0.32 0.35 0.23 0.20 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 
Demographics             
Average Household Income Ratio (4)  2.42 2.71 2.67 2.72 2.62 2.48 2.68 2.68 2.63 2.60 
Average Housing Rental Value Ratio (5)  3.37 2.64 2.56 2.54 2.53 2.73 2.61 2.54 2.62 2.57 
Fraction of Hhs. that move      0.07 0.27 0.43 0.56 0.04 0.15 0.35 0.50 
Fiscal Effects             
Income Tax Rate    0.03 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.10 
Avg. Property Tax Rate    0.24 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.13 
Avg. Tax Burden (property tax + income tax)   $3,500 $3,500 $3,900  $4,800 $6,200 $3,400 $3,700 $4,300 $5,500
(1) “B.E.” denotes “Benchmark Equilibrium”- (2) “Public-Public” is short for “public schools before vouchers, and public schools after vouchers” – (3) “Optimal 
School Type” is the type of school for which the household has the highest religious match - (4) Average Household Income Ratio = avg. hh. income in 
highest housing quality district / avg. hh. income in lowest housing quality district- (5) Average Housing Rental Value Ratio = id. Avg. Hh. Income Ratio, 
but for housing rental value.   43
TABLE 5b 
Universal and Non-Catholic Vouchers in Chicago: Effects on School Quality and Household Welfare 
      Universal Voucher Amt  Non-Catholic Voucher Amt 
All Schools  Data  B.E.  $1,000 $3,000 $5,000 $7,000 $1,000 $3,000 $5,000 $7,000 
Avg. Quality     $10,200 $10,100 $10,000  $10,400 $11,300 $10,100 $11,000 $10,000 $10,200
Avg. Spending    $6,800  $6,700 $6,600 $7,100 $8,100 $6,700 $6,700 $6,700 $7,530 
Avg. Peer Quality  $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000  $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000
Fraction of Hhs. w/higher School Quality       0.50 0.51 0.57 0.65 0.44 0.53 0.53 0.63 
Fraction Low Income Hhs. w/higher Sch. Qual.      0.05 0.06 0.41 0.79 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.69 
Public Schools               
Avg. Quality    $10,200 $10,400 $11,600  $12,300 $11,700 $10,100 $10,700 $11,400 $11,900
Central District    $6,100  $6,000 $5,000 $5,100 $5,700 $5,900 $6,100 $4,900 $5,000 
Suburbs (average)    $13,000 $13,200 $13,800  $13,000 $10,800 $13,100 $13,400 $13,300 $12,300
Avg. Spending   $6,700 $6,800  $7,000 $7,700 $8,300 $7,900 $6,700 $7,200 $7,600 $8,000 
Central District  $5,500 $4,300  $4,200 $3,300 $3,500 $4,000 $4,100 $4,300 $3,300 $3,400 
Suburbs (average)  $7,800 $8,500  $8,700 $9,200 $8,600 $7,000 $8,600 $8,900 $8,800 $8,100 
Avg. Peer Quality  $49,200 $43,000 $43,800 $48,800  $50,900 $49,100 $43,100 $44,500 $48,900 $49,500
Central District  $26,600 $21,400 $21,200 $20,400  $20,400 $19,900 $21,000 $21,000 $20,100 $19,200
Suburbs (average)  $63,900 $58,500 $58,300 $58,300  $57,100 $55,400 $58,400 $58,300 $57,500 $56,400
Private Schools                    
Avg. Quality    $10,700 $9,200 $7,800 $9,100  $11,200 $9,900 $8,700 $8,600  $10,300
Avg. Spending    $6,800  $5,800 $5,100 $6,400 $8,200 $6,290 $5,500 $5,800 $7,300 
Avg. Peer Quality  $67,700 $55,800 $49,500 $40,100  $41,000 $43,700 $53,600 $46,600 $40,900 $42,300
Welfare Implications              
Fraction of Hhs that Win with Vouchers      0.71 0.47 0.46 0.42 0.69 0.60 0.35 0.33 
Fraction of Low Inc. Hhs. that Win w/Vouchers     1.00 0.81 0.69 0.65 0.97 1.00 0.59 0.56 
Avg. Welfare Change     $170  $237  -$106  -$1,040 $97  $215  -$135  -$978 
Avg. Welfare Change / Avg. Hh. Wealth     0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
Winners                 
Avg. Wealth       $47,700 $42,700  $43,900 $42,700 $49,100 $44,900 $41,900 $42,400
Avg. Taste for Catholic Schools      0.95 1.05 1.05 1.06 0.93 0.94 0.88 0.88 
Losers               
Avg. Wealth     $65,700 $61,900  $60,500 $60,300 $61,500 $65,000 $58,700 $58,000
Avg. Taste for Catholic Schools      0.82 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.86 0.87 0.93 0.93   44
FIGURE 1 





4048 M i l e s
 
Note: The fine lines are the boundaries of Census tracts, and different shades identify Census tracts located in 
different school districts. The thick black lines are the boundaries of the pseudo-districts. 
 
FIGURE 2 
Chicago: Housing Quality by Neighborhood 
 FIGURE 3 - Fitted vs. Observed Values  
























































Observed Avg. Hh. Income
 
 
Figure 3c - Average Rental Value 




























Observed Avg. Rental Value
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Note: observed values on the horizontal axis; fitted values on the vertical axis. Circle size is proportional to the 
observation’s total measure of households.   46




a. Nbd. Avg. Household Income (in dollars)
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FIGURE 5 - Chicago: Predicted Household Sorting Across Schools 










0 20 40 60 80 100






















0 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0



















0 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0



















0 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0



















0 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0










Note: Endowment expressed in $10,000. Each graph depicts the most popular choice made by each group of 
households with a given endowment and taste for Catholic schools.   48
 
FIGURE 6 – Chicago: Predicted Effects of Universal Vouchers on School Quality 
 


















































FIGURE 7 – Chicago: Predicted Welfare Gains by Household Endowment and Religious Preferences 
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th percentile of endowment are plotted. 
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Appendix 
Computation of the Equilibrium 
 
In this appendix, I first explain the algorithm used to compute the benchmark and voucher equilibria, and 
then discuss specific aspects related to the treatment of household location and school choice. This 
Appendix refers to Models 2, 3 and 4, which include household idiosyncratic tastes. The algorithm for 
Model 1 is analogous to the one presented here, although with specific provisions to deal with the 
discreteness of household types. See Ferreyra (2002) for further details on the algorithm for Model 1. 
The computation of the benchmark equilibrium for the Chicago metropolitan area takes between 
five and ten seconds in a 3Ghz processor, and the computation of the voucher equilibrium for vouchers 
ranging from $1,000 to $7,000 takes between one and seven hours depending on the voucher program and 
amount. 
 
The Algorithm: Overview 
 
Chart I depicts the algorithm that calculates an equilibrium. The computation of an equilibrium consists of 
two nested loops: an outer loop of major iterations for voting and adjustment of community compositions 
and school quality, and an inner loop of minor iterations for the choice of location and school type. The 
sequence of major iterations concludes when agents cannot gain any utility by moving or switching to a 
different type of school, and all endogenous variables have converged. 
The algorithm, which is coded in ANSI C++, follows the steps explained below. Notice that steps 3 
through 5 comprise the inner loop, in which property tax rates, community compositions, public school 
quality, spending per student, number of people in public schools, and property tax base are held constant 
and taken as given by households when making choices. 
1.  For the benchmark equilibrium, set up the community structure for the computational version of 
the model, and define initial prices for houses and non-residential property in all locations. For 
the voucher equilibrium, take the benchmark equilibrium as the starting point. 
2.  Households vote for tax rates and spending in public schools. In the first iteration while 
computing the benchmark equilibrium, households vote for property taxes in the district where 
their endowed houses are located, as though they all attended public schools. Otherwise, 
households vote for taxes in the districts where they would prefer to live. A district’s new tax rate 
is the one chosen by the district’s median voter. Given the new tax rates, districts’ spending per 
student and public school quality are updated.    ii
3.  Households choose their optimal location and type of school given the election outcomes; when 
considering a location, households evaluate the public and private schools available there.  
4.  Once all households have made their choice, the algorithm computes the excess of demand for 
houses in each location and adjusts the price of houses in all neighborhoods proportionally to 
each neighborhood’s excess of demand according to the following price adjustment rule:   
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 1 0 1 h d cED h d P h d P + = ,  where the subscript 1 stands for the current iteration, and 0 
for the previous one. ED(d,h) denotes the excess of demand for housing in district d and 
neighborhood h. The parameter c is the adjustment factor. It is set to 0.01 at the beginning of 
every round of price adjustments, and it is adjusted using a bisection rule as departures are 
detected from the convergence path on the way to the equilibrium.  
5.  Check whether there is a nonzero excess demand in some location. If there is, go back to (3), 
which will in turn lead to a new adjustment of prices in (4). The inner loop of location choice and 
price adjustments continues until supply equals demand in all locations. In each of these minor 
iterations, the value of a household’s endowment is updated as the price of its endowed house 
changes during price adjustments. Households keep their endowment house throughout the inner 
loop.  
6.  Repeat steps (3), (4) and (5) until prices clear the housing market in each location. 
7.  Adjust community compositions, non-residential property tax base, number of public school 
households, and public school quality for each district.  
8.  If households have experienced utility gains in the current major iteration by moving and/or 
changing schools, start a new major iteration. The outer loop continues until households cannot 
gain any utility by moving or switching to a different school, and all endogenous variables have 
converged. 
 
Further Details on the Algorithm 
 
a. Benchmark Equilibrium 
 
 
To simplify the explanation of the computational treatment of household location and school choice, 
some additional notation is in order. Each household i in the economy belongs to a non-idiosyncratic 
household type j, which represents a combination of income endowment yn, house endowment valued at 
pn , and religious type k. This non-idiosyncratic type exists with measure j µ , and the total number of non-
idiosyncratic types is  K H I J × × = . In addition, location (d,h) has a measure of houses equal to  dh µ , so   iii
that district d has a total measure of houses equal to  ∑ =
h
dh d µ µ . Let m denotes school type; m=1, 2, 3 
represents public, private Catholic and private non-Catholic school respectively. Furthermore, the triplet 
(d,h,m) denotes the joint choice of location (d,h) and school type m.  
When choosing (d,h,m), household i  of non-idiosyncratic type j obtains 
utility
idhm e k c s U dh jdhm jdhm idhm
ε α β β α − − =
1 . Since all households of non-idiosyncratic type j choosing (d,h,m) 
experience the same consumption and parental valuation of school quality, we can write this utility as 
idhm e U U jdhm idhm
ε * = . Define  ) log(
~ * U U ≡ . Hence, the share of non-idiosyncratic type j households who 
choose  ) , , ( m h d  equals  () ' ' ' ' ' '
~ ~
m h id m h jd idhm jdhm U U P ε ε + > +  for all  ) ' , ' , ' ( m h d  not equal to (d,h,m). 



























. Thus, the total demand for any given location 
(d,h) is ∑∑
jm
j jdhm P µ , and the prices pdh  that equalize the demand for each location to the supply 
dh µ clear the housing market. 
With regards to the voting equilibrium, households of non-idiosyncratic type j who choose 
(d,h,m) vote for their optimal property tax rate  jdhm t in district d’s polls. The measure of such households 
is j jdhm P µ . The median voter for this district is the household who votes for a tax rate equal to the median 
of the distribution of the selected tax rates.  
 
b. Voucher equilibrium 
 
Since households of non-idiosyncratic type j vary in their idiosyncratic preferences, they potentially make 
different benchmark equilibrium choices of location and school. Furthermore, their different location 
choices imply different amounts of capital gains or losses in the voucher equilibrium, which gives rise to 
different budget constraints. Hence, for computational reasons I re-define a non-idiosyncratic type as the 
set of households with the same income and house endowment, religious type, and benchmark 
equilibrium location choice. In other words, non-idiosyncratic type v is the set of households of the 
original non-idiosyncratic type j that choose benchmark equilibrium location ) ˆ , ˆ ( h d . In this re-definition, 
the number of non-idiosyncratic types equals  H J V × = . Hereafter, an asterisk denotes the benchmark   iv
equilibrium. Non-idiosyncratic type v has measure  j
m








ˆ ˆ ; of course, 
∑∑∑ =
dhm
j j jdhm P µ µ
* . During the computation of the voucher equilibrium, the budget constraint for 
type v equals  ()
*
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
* ) 1 ( ) max( ) 1 (
h d h d n n y dh d p p p y t T p t c − + + − = − + + + υ , whereυ is the voucher amount, 
*
ˆ ˆh d p is the benchmark equilibrium price of the house chosen by the original idiosyncratic type j in location 
) ˆ , ˆ ( h d ,  
h d p ˆ ˆ is the price for that house in the current iteration, and
*
n p is the proceeds from selling the 
endowed house in the benchmark equilibrium. 
Denote by 
idhm e V V vdhm idhm
ε * = the utility enjoyed by household i of non-idiosyncratic type v by 
choosing (d,h,m) under vouchers, and define  ) log(
~ * V V = . Under vouchers, the share of households of 
non-idiosyncratic type v who choose (d, h, m) equals  () ' ' ' ' ' '
~ ~
m h id m h vd idhm vdhm V V P ε ε + > +  for all (d’, h’, m’) 
not equal to (d, h, m). From the definition of the non-idiosyncratic type v, this share equals the share of 
households of the original non-idiosyncratic type j who choose (d, h, m) under vouchers conditional on 
having chosen  ) ˆ , ˆ ( h d  in the benchmark equilibrium, or 






ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ' ' ' ' ' '  for all  ) , , ( m h d  
different from  ) ' , ' , ' ( m h d  and all  ) ˆ , ˆ ( h d  different from  ) , ( h d .  
Since this share does not have a closed form solution, I compute it by simulation as follows. I 
randomly draw R independent vectors of idiosyncratic tastes, each one of dimension  3 × H , such that all 
vector elements come from a type I extreme value distribution with scale parameter (1/b). I use the same 
R vectors for each non-idiosyncratic type v. For each non-idiosyncratic type v, I keep the  v N vectors 
whose elements are consistent with the type having chosen its benchmark equilibrium location. Choosing 
a sufficiently large R ensures that the simulated shares approximate well the benchmark equilibrium 
closed-form shares. In any given iteration, I compute the share of households of type v making choice 
(d,h,m) as  v vdhm vdhm N N P / ˆ = , where the numerator is the number of vectors of idiosyncratic tastes that 
render (d,h,m) as the optimal choice for households of non-idiosyncratic type v. The computation of the 
demand for a given location, and of the voting equilibrium, is analogous to that in the benchmark 
equilibrium. 
For the analysis of the outcomes of policy simulations, I proceed as follows. Since voucher 
effects differ across households of even the same non-idiosyncratic type, I keep track of the benchmark 
and voucher equilibrium choices for each household involved in the voucher simulation. In the case of   v
Chicago, the computation of the benchmark equilibrium manipulates J=750 non-idiosyncratic types, 
whereas the computation of the voucher equilibrium handles V=750x15=11,250 non-idiosyncratic types. 
These, in turn, become 750,000 households in order to simulate the choice shares as described above. By 
storing pre- and pos- voucher information for each of these households, I am able to estimate the 
distribution of voucher effects for any desired group of households. 
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